is~coming increasingly popular to assert that money growth cannot be controlled and, therefore, that monetary policy should stop targeting monetary growth and try to control other variables that may affect economic activity and the rate of inflation. Many argue that, although excessive long-run monetary growth is clearly the dominant cause of inflation, attempts to control it are so weak and uncertain that they create more problems than benefits. Even casual observation seems to support these arguments: in the United States, the Federal Reserve System has announced monetary growth targets since 1973, but has achieved only questionable success in reaching them; in many foreign countries, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, targets were established, but were either persistently or occasionally violated; in Switzerland, monetary control has been successful, but is viewed as an aberration due to the country's small size and other uniquely favorable conditions. For most of the '70s, this lack of success was caused by the monetary authorities' desire to simultaneously stabilize short-term interest rates and control money growth. Whenever interest rate and money growth targets became inconsistent, most central banks preferred to abandon money growth targets, producing erratic and generally excessive monetary growth. In October 1979, however, the Federal Reserve heralded a change in operating procedure, announcing that it would place more emphasis on the control of monetary aggregates as opposed to the stabilization of the federal funds rate.
1 Still, during 1980, U.S. money growth turned out to be both considerably more erratic and somewhat higher than originally desired.
It is not surprising, therefore, that many analysts have become convinced that a monetary policy designed to stabilize the growth of monetary aggregates is neither desirable nor achievable.2 This criticism usually has taken four separate lines of thought:
1. Money growth doesn't matter. The relationship between the growth of gross national product 1 The federal funds rate is the interest rate at which depository mstitutions borrow reserves from each other. 2 "The Pitfalls of Mechanical Monetarism," The Morgan Guar- anty Survey (February 1981) , pp. 8-13. (whose steady expansion is the ultimate goal of any macroeconomic stabilization policy) and monetary growth is too variable; successful control of monetary growth cannot mitigate fluctuations in economic activity and the rate of inflation.
2. Money growth does matter, but should not be controlled because it would cause greater volatility in other crucial economic variables (such as interest or exchange rates). This, in turn, would produce economic disruptions far worse than those created by rapid and erratic money growth.
3. Monetary base growth doesn't matter. The relationship between the monetary base (which consists of bank reserves and currency held by the public, and which the central bank can control directly) and the quantity of money in the economy is both highly variable and unpredictable; tight control of the base will not produce stable growth of money.
4. Monetary base growth cannot be controlled. This is so, either because the central bank must supply currency on demand or because some of the Federal Reserve balance sheet items are determined by transactions outside its control. Since base growth underlies money growth, money growth cannot be controlled. 
What is Money and How is it Created?
Money is usually defined as those objects that are generally accepted in payment for goods, services and debts. In the United States, these consist of currency and checkable deposits.~This definition of the money stock, which excludes U.S. Treasury and interbank deposits, is referred to as M1B. It consists of currency and checkable deposits in the hands of the private nonbank public, and state and local governments.
When the public wants more money, it obtains it from those institutions whose liabilities are acceptable as money. These consist of commercial banks, whose liabilities include demand deposits, autpmatic transfer accounts (ATS) and negotiable orders of withdrawal (NOW); thrift institutions, which issue NOW accounts; and credit unions, which issue credit union share drafts. Federal Reserve Banks, whose liabilities also include money, do not deal with the public and, therefore, do not directly contribute to the creation of money.
When the public as a whole desires more money (and the monetary authorities supply the necessary reserves), it sells a variety of assets, including promissory notes (i.e., loans) to the banking system as a whole (all private institutions whose liabilities are money), receiving payment in currency or in checkable deposits. As these receipts are spent and respent, a portion winds up as someone's currency holdings or checkable deposits, and the money stock will increase.
It is crucial to understand, however, that an increase in loans by the banking system does not necessarily result in an increase in the money stock. For example, if an individual puts $100 from his checking account into his savings account, thus decreasing the stock of money by $100, and the bank lends the resulting excess reserves to a second individual who adds it to his checkable deposits, thus increasing the money stock, bank loans and the total amount of credit will have increased, but not the money stock. 5
t Time deposits or money market mutual fund shares are not money since they cannot be spent without conversion into currency or checkable deposits. Credit cards represent either existing checkable deposits or deposits that will be created by a bank.
5 1f one were to deposit currency into a savings account, the resultant increase in excess reserves would cause an expansion of loans and money. But loans would increase by more.
Although the expansion of loans by the banking system is the mechanism through which the money stock increases, not all loans result in money growth.
Since bank loans and investments are a source of bank profits, and since banks are profit-maximizing institutions, we should and do observe that they make loans to the full extent that they are able. What then constrains their ability to make loans and expand the stock of money?
Bank Reserves and Their Role in Money Creation
In the United States, all financial institutions that create checking deposits are legally required to hold reserves against these deposits either in their vaults or in accounts with Federal Reserve Banks. These reserve requirements are imposed as a percentage of various deposits. Thus, if the average reserve requirement is 10 percent and the banking system wished to create new checkable deposits of $100, it must obtain reserves of $10. Since both currency and deposits with Federal Reserve Banks are Federal Reserve liabilities, the banking system can obtain reserves by selling securities to, or borrowing from, the Federal Reserve System.
In principle, the Federal Reserve could always refuse to buy securities or to make loans. It would thus restrict the availability of reserves and the banking system's ability to create new checkable deposits. Similarly, the Federal Reserve can buy securities at an attractive price or make loans on attractive terms, inducing the banking system to acquire excess reserves.
6 Since excess reserves do not produce income for the bank's stockholders, banks will expand their loans, creating deposits and adding to the money stock.
Currency in the hands of the nonbank public represents another source of bank reserves which may also account for the expansion of the money stock. For example, if an individual deposits $100 in currency into his checking account, the bank's vault cash (part of its reserves) rises by $100. Because the bank must hold only $10 as a reserve for the newly created $100 of deposits, it now has $90 of excess reserves with which to expand its loans and deposits. Thus, the constraint on monetary expansion is not only the availability of bank reserves (deposits at Federal Reserve Banks and vault cash), but also the amount of cur-°E xcessreserves are reserves over and above required reserves. rency in the hands of the public. The sum of these two is referred to as the monetary base.
7 It will be viewed as the constraining magnitude of bank deposit expansion or contraction for the remainder of this article.
Problems in Controlling the Monetary Base and Money Growth
The discussion so far seemingly implies that control of money growth is a relatively simple matter. Since the monetary base is a liability of the Federal Reserve System, it can be tightly controlled by the System; since monetary expansion is dependent on the availability of monetary base, money growth can be expected to follow a desired path. Yet much of the criticism leveled at monetary policy rests on the premise that money growth cannot be controlled.
Given the prior description of the mechanics of money creation, monetary control problems will exist only if the monetary base cannot be controlled with sufficient precision or, given a specific path of monetary base growth, if money growth is unpredictable. For instance, analysts often argue that many items on the Federal Reserve balance sheet vary with the vagaries of bank and public behavior. Or, that the relationship between the monetary base and the money stock is so volatile, that even if the monetary base is controlled, money growth will refuse to behave in the desired manner.
It is true, of course, that the use of an additional dollar of reserves is deter-mined by banks and the public. Banks, through their willingness to hold excess reserves, and the public, through its willingness to hold currency, time deposits or checkable deposits, both affect the amount of money created out of each additional dollar of reserves.
Whether these are serious problems is an empirical issue. If the Federal Reserve System cannot control certain items on its balance sheet, can it offset these items with relative ease? If bank and public decisions can vary substantially, do they in fact do so? Are these changes offsetting? Are they predictable? These questions must be answered before one can decide if money stock control is impossible.
Control of the Monetary Base
A simplified balance sheet of the Federal Reserve System is shown in table 1.
Because the balance sheet must balance, it can be rewritten as: Clearly, the Federal Reserve can decide the amount of foreign currencies or securities it wishes to buy or sell.
8 It can decide, except as a lender of last resort in a national liquidity crisis, the amount that it will Gold certificates are issued by the U.S. Treasury and must be bought by the Federal Reserve System. Whenever the gold stock changes, the Treasury issues or withdraws gold certificates at some prescribed official price. Since, for the past decade, there have been few The average net weekly variation in the sum of nondiscretionary accounts was a decrease of $71 million, Table 2 shows the annual behavior of the monetary again, a trivial change in the Fed's security portfolio. 11 base multiplier from 1970 to 1980. Column 1 lists anThis discussion demonstrates that the Federal Renual average levels of the monthly multiplier, column serve can control the monetary base even on a weekly 2 presents year-to-year changes of these averages, colbasis if it so desires. There is, of course no question umns 3 and 4 show the maximum and minimum levels that it can do so over longer periods of time.
of the monthly multiplier in any given year, and column 5 lists the differences between these maximum and minimum levels.
Does Control of the Monetary Base Imply
Suppose that M1B is $384.8 billion in the fourth quarter of 1979, and we want it to grow at a 5.5 perAs indicated previously, the banking system and the nonbanking public decide how each additional dollar 3 depicts the average weekly net variation (where decreases are subtracted from increases).
The Federal Reserve's ability to offset variations in nondiscretionaiy accounts on a weekly basis depends on the variability of the sum of all nondiscretionary accounts. In 1980 this sum varied on average, in absolute terms, $1,409 million per week. Since the average weekly absolute variation in security holdings alone was $3,271 million, it is clear that changes in nondiscretionary accounts can be easily offset. Moreover, one need not be concerned that these nondiscretionary Table 3 shows the resulting levels of monesupplied in order to achieve this growth? Consider the tary base, the resulting levels of M1B (which are results obtained by using two alternative, simple and computed by multiplying the base level by the actual mec anistic procedures. In the first procedure, monemonthly multiplier) and the resultmg monthly and tary base is supplied at a constant monthly rate; in quarterly annualized rates of growth of Mill. For we second, monetary base growth varies each month to achieve a monthly M lB growth of 5.5 percent (at ?ompanson~the actual monthly and quarterly annualan annual rate).
Control of Money Growth?
ized rates of growth of M1B in 1980 are also shown. This procedure would have resulted in a fourthquarter-to-fourth-quarter M1B growth of 5.7 percent, a shade above the desired growth of 5.5 percent in-
Procedure I: Monetary Base Grows at Constant Amount Each Month
laSome analysts allege that one cannot assume that the multiplier would have been the same as it actually existed. They Table 2 indicates that the avera e multiplier in argue that tight control of the monetary base would have produced much larger fluctuations in interest rates, thus affect-1979 was 2.583, and that over the past 10 years, the ing bank and the public's behavior, which in turn affects the multiplier declined on average 1w 037. Thus let us multiplier. Thus, the multiplier would have been much more What about money growth fluctuations within the monetary base. This level is determined using iast year? While most economists agree that month-tomonth's multiplier. In effect, this procedure requires month fluctuations in money growth have no impact that we attempt to return to the desired money growth on economic activity, some believe that quarterly path each month. As before, for comparison, we will fluctuations do. Using this criterion, Procedure I assume that actual monthly levels of the multiplier in did not produce an appreciably better performance.
1980 would have prevailed. Neither monthly nor quarterly money growth resulting from supplying a constant amount of base would Let us assume again that we want money to grow at thus determining the appropriate injection of monethe same annual rate as before. In the first procedure, tary base. The resulting monthly M1B growth again we assumed that the multiplier would remain conis not substantially better than the actual 1980 outstant over the year and, thus we supplied a constant come, but the quarterly growth is significantly more stable. Moreover the annual M1B growth would have amount of monetary base each month. Suppose, mbeen 5.2 nercent instead of the desired 5.5 percent stead, we assume that next months multiplier will be 17 exactly as it was last month and that we want to have and actual 7.3 percent. M1B grow at a 5.5 percent annual rate each month.
Here, if the multiplier had varied exactly as it acFor each month we must now calculate an appropriate tually did in 1980, a simple and "mechanistic" base level of M1B, then supply a corresponding level of control procedure would have produced a significantly 16 1n this procedure, the standard deviation of MIB growth declines from 1980 actual by 26 percent on a monthly basis~~Sthndard deviation of MIB growth declines 26 percent on and by 25 percent on a quarterly basis, a monthly basis and 59 percent on a quarterly basis.
smaller, and vary less, than those which it can control directly.
The assertion that control of monetary growth is impossible because the monetary base multiplier behaves erratically is examined by using two simple and "mechanistic" monetary base control procedures and applying them to actual multiplier variations of 1980. Since the multiplier varied more in 1980 than it had on average over the past 11 years, such a simulation constitutes a reasonable test. The results indicate that by using base control and making no adjustments during the year, annual growth targets could have been achieved with greater precision although money growth stability dvring the year could have been improved only slightly. When simple adjustments were permitted, annual targets would have been reached with a lower error and greater stability. Since there are several more sophisticated monetary control procedures in existence than the two presented here, an even better method of money growth control can be developed.
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The article does not discuss whether tight control of the monetary base would produce larger variability in credit or other markets. However, if control of inflation is the paramount goal of the central bank, perhaps the nation would indeed be well served by "rigid mechanical monetarism." 
